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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CRESTVIEW-HOLLADAY HOME OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs, 
ENGH FLORAL CO., a Utah corpora-
tion, dba Engh Floral and Garden 
Center, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a 
Political Subdivision, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
CASE NO. 14090 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiffs and Respondents herein respectfully peti-
tion the court for a rehearing on the following grounds: 
1. The court failed to give proper approbation to _he 
advantageous position of the trial court in weighing the 
evidence and improperly overturned the trial court's find-
ings when they were supported by substantial evidence. 
2. The court's misconstruction of the terms "arbitrary" 
and "capricious" seriously undermines the power and respon-
sibility of courts to review challenged actions of county 
zoning officials. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
Nature of Case 
This was an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court setting aside as spot zoning an amendment to the 
Salt Lake County Zoning Ordinances reclassifying thirteen 
acres of Engh Floral Company's property from Agricultural 
A-l to Residential R-M and Commercial C-2. 
Disposition on Appeal 
This court held the Board of Commissioners of Salt 
Lake County acted within the scope of its legislative 
powers, the reclassification ordinance was adopted pur-
suant to a planning scheme developed for that portion of 
the county in question, and the Homeowners Association had 
failed to sustain their burden that the action of the county 
was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. 
Statement of Facts 
On August 16, 1973, the Salt Lake County Commission 
by a 2-1 vote approved Engh Floral Company's application 
for rezoning and reclassified a thirteen acre parcel of 
property in the heart of a single and two-family residen-
tial district from an A-l to a C-2 and R-M zone. The three 
acre parcel zoned C-2 could potentially be used for such 
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activities as a service station, restaurant, and a Class B 
beer outlet. On the ten acres zoned R-M there could be 
constructed 200 new residential units, and if conditional 
uses are granted, business offices, hotels, nursing homes 
and mobile home parks could be located on the R-M property. 
Fearing the potential effect of this zoning change on 
the character of the neighborhood, the surrounding property 
owners challenged the validity of the reclassification or-
dinance. The trial court held the sole motive for enacting 
the reclassification ordinance was to amend the zoning pat-
tern to comply with the Engh Floral Company non-conforming 
use, such action being arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious; 
the sole and exclusive benefit of the zoning change would be 
to Engh Floral Company as it would enhance materially the 
value of its property; the rezoning would not add to the 
enjoyment of the adjacent property, but would alter irre-
vocably the character of the general area and so burden the 
neighboring residential area as to cause substantial and mat-
erial damage to the adjacent property owners and impair the 
use and enjoyment of their property; there is no need to 
rezone the area to permit uses other than those embraced 
within permissible non-conforming uses; and the zoning or-
dinance reclassifying the Engh Floral Company property con-
stitutes spot zoning and is invalid. 
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This court reversed the trial court's finding and 
upheld the reclassification ordinance basing its decision on 
its so-called "policy" to avoid substituting its judgment 
for that of the legislative body of the municipality. 
ARGUMENT 
I '-
THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE PROPER APPROBATION TO THE 
ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN WEIGHING THE 
EVIDENCE AND IMPROPERLY OVERTURNED THE TRIAL COURT'S FIND-
INGS WHEN THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The basis for this court's determination to overrule 
the judgment of the trial court is expressed in the follow-
ing excerpt from the decision: 
The prior decisions of this court without 
exception have laid down the rule that the ex-
ercise of the zoning power is a legislative func-
tion to be exercised by the legislative bodies of 
the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning plan# 
its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the 
district to be zoned are matters which lie solely 
within that discretion. It is the policy of this 
court as enunciated in its prior decisions that 
it will avoid substituting its judgment for that 
of the legislative body of the municipality. 
Despite this court's manifest dissatisfaction to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County, it has a duty to accept the trial 
court's findings that the reclassification ordinance con-
stitutes spot zoning and that the action of the Board of 
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County Commissioners was arbitrary, unreasonable and cap-
ricious if there is any substantial evidence to support 
its findings. -
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 Utah 2d 143, 
449 P.2d 989 (1969) the plaintiffs purchased property near 
on and off ramps for the 1-15 Freeway with the hopes of 
converting grazing land worth twenty or thirty dollars per 
acre into highway service land worth $10,000 per acre. 
The Beaver County Commissioners refused to rezone the sub-
ject property to permit highway services on the basis that 
the property would cause a loss of tourist business to 
existing cities in the county, the county would be required 
to furnish police protection to the proposed new area and 
transporation would need to be provided for school children 
who might live there to established schools in the county. 
This court implied dissatisfaction with the action of the 
Board of Commissioners of Beaver County but apparently felt 
constrained to uphold their decision rather than overrule 
the trial court. The court stated: 
Whether we agree with the wisdom of the 
county commissioners or do not agree with it 
is of no importance. The matter is to be de-
cided by a legislative body (the county com-
mission) , and the courts do not ordinarily 
interfere in such matters. However, should a 
board enact an ordinance which deprives a per-
son of his property, and where it is clear that 
the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, 
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or in a discriminating manner, the courts 
will grant redress. 
* * * 
This being an equitable proceeding, 
we may review the findings but should not 
disturb them unless they are clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar the trial court determined that 
the county officials had acted in an arbitrary, capricious 
and unreasonable manner and these findings should stand un-
less clearly against the weight of evidence. The fact that 
this court on appeal might have viewed the matter differently 
does not justify a reversal of the trial court's findings 
and judgment. In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 28 6, 4 95 
P.2d 811 (1972), a suit in equity to set aside deeds, the 
court stated: 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that 
this action to avoid deeds is one in equity 
upon which this court has both the preroga-
tive and the duty to review and weigh the 
evidence, and to determine the facts. How-
ever , in the practical application of that 
rule it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of 
the trial court, in close proximity to the 
parties and the witnesses, there is indulged 
a presumption of correctness of his findings 
and judgment, with the burden upon the appel-
lant to show they were in error; and where 
the evidence is in conflict, we do not upset 
his findings merely because we may have re-
viewed the matter differently, but do so only 
if evidence clearly preponderates against them. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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See also Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 
(1970); Nelson v. Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 513 P.2d 1011 
(1973); and Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 
(1973) . 
In the case at bar there was substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's findings and judgment that the 
Salt Lake County zoning officials acted in an arbitrary, 
capricious or discriminatory manner and that the ordinance 
in question amounts to spot zoning. The Engh Floral Company 
is the only commercial enterprise in the area bounded by 
3300 South and 4500 South on the north and south and 2300 
East and Highland Drive on the east and west (JR.56,45). The 
thirteen acres involved represents approximately one per-
cent of the approximately 1,240 acres lying in this core 
area. The property situated directly south of the Engh 
Floral Company is zoned R-l-10 (generally authorizing ag-
riculture and single family homes); property to the east 
and northwest is zoned R-2-104 (generally authorizing ag-
riculture and one and two family dwellings); and property 
to the west is zoned R-2-8 (generally authorizing agricul-
ture and one and two family dwellings) (Ex. 16-P; R.144,145). 
In one of Mr. Engh's previous applications to change the zon-
ing on his property the Staff Report for the District Plan-
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ning Commission had recommended the application be denied 
as spot zoning and stated it would be "very poor planning 
to allow any commercial zoning at this location11 (R.146). 
Clayne Ricks, Planning Director for the Salt Lake Planning 
Commission, testified that the rezoning would enhance the 
value of the Engh property and that he could not recall a 
similar zoning change in Salt Lake County in the last five 
years (R.148,65)." 
This court's decision makes no reference to the above-
stated facts. They are unrebutted, relevant and material. 
This court, in derogation of its own stated principals of 
the scope of appellate review, simply disregarded the lower 
court's findings and based its decision on its "policy" 
to avoid substituting its judgment for that of the Board of 
County Commissioners. Does it matter that this court sub-
stituted its judgment or opinion for that of the trier of 
the facts? The only facts cited in this court's opinion 
that support its conclusion are either in conflict with 
other evidence or else are insubstantial in light of other 
facts. 
In its opinion this court states that "it is doubtful 
that the term 'spot zoning' applies to this case in view of 
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the size of the tract". The trial court, which heard the 
evidence, found the facts to be "spot zoning." The evidence 
in that regard was substantial and convincing, and nowhere 
does this court hold that such a determination was a question 
of law. Clayne Ricks, who is the recognized expert in 
zoning matters in Salt Lake County, testified that the size 
of the parcel rezoned is immaterial as a parcel of one 
hundred acres could constitute spot zoning if completely 
detrimental or for the benefit of one person (R.56). This 
court also relies on the Big Cottonwood Master Plan to 
support the action of the County Commissioners. In so doing 
the court either overlooked or disregarded the testimony of 
Clayne Ricks that Williams and Mocine, the consulting firm 
which drew up the Master Plan, worked extensively with the 
Planning Commission (R.55). In essence, the consulting firm 
was simply back stopping the decision which the Planning 
Commission had already taken to approve the Engh rezoning 
application. 
Finally, in an attempt to show spot zoning is not 
-involved this court observes there are a number of commercial 
enterprises surrounding the Engh property. While other 
"enterprises" may exist they are few in number, extremely 
small and limited in nature, exist as non-conforming uses 
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and do not have an impact on the character of the neighbor-
hood. Engh Floral is the only real business in the immed-
iate area. Furthermore, as argued in Respondent's Appeal 
Brief, the theory of zoning is that non-conforming uses 
being detrimental to the public are not to be perpetuated, 
but should be gradually eliminated to comport the area to 
the comprehensive zoning plan. 
The case at bar involves a factual determination of 
whether the action of the Salt Lake County zoning officials 
in adopting the ordinance reclassifying the Engh property 
constitutes spot zoning. After having thoroughly considered 
the testimony and exhibits presented at trial the lower 
court concluded the ordinance in question constituted "spot 
zoning". Such a finding is supported by substantial evidence 
and should have been sustained on appeal if this court is 
to adhere to its own stated principals relating to the trial 
court's findings. 
II 
THE COURT'S MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE TERMS "ARBITRARY" 
AND "CAPRICIOUS" SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE POWER AND RES-
PONSIBILITY OF COURTS TO REVIEW CHALLENGED ACTIONS OF 
ZONING OFFICIALS. 
Courts ordinarily should not interfere in zoning mat-
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ters. However, it is the court's inherent responsibility to 
see that the zoning officials do not abuse the liberal 
discretion they are given and to take action when the zoning 
officials act in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory 
manner. The duty of this court not to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the county zoning officials is no more im-
perative than the power and duty of this court to set aside 
any purported exercise of the zoning officials' discretion 
which is in fact arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. 
Zoning in this respect can no more escape judicial review 
than any other purported exercise of the police power. 
The only other possible rational explanation for this 
court's decision is that it misconstrued the terms "arbitrary" 
and "capricious". These words when used in a legal sense 
are to be distinguished from the same words used in a pop-
ular sense, where they have an opprobious connotation. In 
Ostler v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 437, 36 P.2d 95, 
98 (1934) this court had occasion to define the terras "arbi-
trary" and "capricious". The court stated: 
It would seem the words "arbitrarily" and 
"capriciously" are used merely to characterize 
a conclusion, when the conclusion is announced 
with no substantial evidence to support it or a 
conclusion contrary to substantial competent 
evidence. 
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While the above definition was used in the context of 
a review of a decision of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
this definition applies to a review of all decisions of ad-
ministrative bodies, including zoning officials, which are 
challenged as arbitrary and capricious. For cases in which 
courts have defined the terms "arbitrary" and "capricious" 
in their legal sense see the following cases: City of 
North Little Rock v. Habrle, 239 Ark. 1007, 395 S.W.2d 
751, 753 (arbitrary and capricious action of zoning officials 
defined to mean not guided by steady judgment or purpose); 
Tri-County Electric Co-op, Inc. v. Elkin, N.D. _, 
224 N.W.2d 785, 794 (arbitrary and capricious used to indi-
cate the findings are without rational basis or that the 
evidence to support the findings is nonexistent or without 
probative value); Toole v. Toole, 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d 
389, 391 (arbitrary and capricious used to mean the verdict 
is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence); Canty 
v. Board of Education, City of New York, D.C.N.Y., 312 F.Supp. 
254, 256 (an administrative decision is arbitrary and cap-
ricious when it is not supported by evidence or where there 
is no reasonable justification for the decision); Montgomery 
County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 76 A.2d 261, 
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267 (county zoning board's denial of application for excep-
tion based on incorrect legal premise and unsupported by 
substantial evidence was arbitrary and capricious in a legal 
sense and could be set aside by the court). 
It would be hard to conceive of a more classic example 
of spot zoning than that present in the case at bar. The 
trial court's findings are explicit in showing the one-sided 
benefit of the reclassification ordinance and the potential 
deteriorative effect of the ordinance on the character of 
the neighborhood in question. The findings of the trial 
court further indicate the zoning officials' action was based 
on an incorrect legal premise, i.e., amending the zoning pat-
ern to comply with Engh Floral Company's non-conforming use 
(See Point III of Respondent's Brief). To reverse these 
findings and the judgment entered below because of this 
court's "policy" to avoid substituting "its" judgment for 
the legislative body of the municipality is tantamount to 
giving the zoning officials a carte blanche in all zoning 
decisions. 
The precedent established by this court's decision 
seriously undermines the power and responsibility of our 
courts to set aside arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory 
actions of zoning officials. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this court was duty bound to give 
approbation to the findings of the trial court and uphold its 
judgment as they were supported by substantial evidence. 
Not only did the court not follow the lower court decision, 
it failed to mention and distinguish the facts relied on by 
the trial court in reaching its decision. 
For these reasons, a rehearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William G. Fowler 
Terry L. Christiansen 
ROE AND FOWLER 
34 0 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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